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interview_anihttps://aillarionov.livejournal.com/1324316.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PG0faYa5qDw
English translation nipastu
Discussion in Jamestown Foundation
Baev: ...for Russia in the coming few weeks in the Kherson region. On... For that grouping of the Russian troops reinforced grouping...
Howard: Why? I need say that.
Baev: Why reinforced?
Howard: In the Kherson. Why is defeat booming?
Baev: Yes. Our grouping is reinforced when Ukraine announced that this is the main direction. New units were brought there. But the more units are brought there, the more supplies you need to deliver. And the bridges are constantly on the fire constantly destroyed the grouping is effectively tracked and is degraded very, very quickly. Even if the terrain is not very favorable for a breakthrough, it's very flat, very open. You cannot camouflage your forces, and the air power still is a significant factor. Nevertheless the degrading of this grouping proceeds very fast and there is no way to achieve... You cannot present it as a redeployment or regrouping. It's going to be a rout.
Howard: Because they cannot get across the Dnieper.
Baev: They cannot get across the Dnieper. The bridges are blocked. Supplies are not coming. Without supplies it's increasingly difficult to resist Ukrainian push, and Ukrainians are not rushing. They are probing a little bit here, probing there, from different directions. In one of the places they are certain to find a weak spot and then breakthrough much the same way as we observed in Kharkov region; only with the difference that there Russians, I don't know, had clear away of retreat and here no way: river Dnieper is too wide. And so, that rout is certain to resonate far stronger even than the events we observed in September.
Yes. What can we kind of... How can we construct a scenario out of this point of departure? A retreat is happening in a matter of few w... A defeat is happening in a matter of a few weeks, which is impossible to hide. And I think it's entirely possible to construct scenarios of this sort of catastrophe, of that sort of catastrophe of nuclear catastrophe. of a breakdown of... Russia's Rupture as I said here is a very good book.
What I'm trying to think about is how to establish a range of options on non-catastrophic defeat. Russia, yes, it is very good at self-destruction. There is a various established track record. If you look at Russia's history you will find all sorts of examples finding a way out of this defeat that would not signify a Russian civil war, collapse of the Russian state. It really is not that easy, I would say. But then a disaster is too easy to predict. But it's also in many ways a very negative way of thinking, so to say. Nobody needs this disaster, even Ukraine, where you can hear voices arguing, along the line, that Russia is the Carthage which must be destroyed. Well you're thinking about what that would mean, and you start thinking probably with better withdraws or not probably we need to see whether it is possible to manage this disaster, which is not going to be an act, a total capitulation, which is going to be a process. The process of this defeat must become manageable. That's, I think, a task we need to focus on.
And I think two key conditions are essential for this sort of thinking. First that there is no first nuclear use, and I think that despite all Putin's rhetoric, despite all the discourse this condition is entirely realistic. Russia is not really preparing its non-strategic nuclear forces for a first use. I Rely only on open sources, I don't have any access to classified intelligence, but what I see that all the nuclear warheads remain as they did for the last 31 years on the lock in the 12 centralized storages. That was the last thing Gorbachev did: make sure that they are locked there and there is no physical activity around these storages. There is no preparation for using them. That's a big difference, by the way, from the Cuban Missile Crisis, where there was really a lot of physical things related to nuclear warheads. Here we have only words. Words matter, I agree. But it is rather complicated task...
Howard: But you're referring to strategic nukes...
Baev: No, non-strategic.
Howard: You're turning to no non-strategic?
Baev: Strategic nukes are a different story. Yes.
Howard: So you're saying there's no signs of strategic nukes...
Baev: No, I'm saying, no signs of non-strategic use because they are locked in these 12 centralized storages for 30 plus years. That was two initiatives taken at the same time by President Bush Senior and Mikhail Gorbachev to make sure that all non-strategic warheads are stored. So not a single officer in the Russian military has experience, first, a experience in handling non-strategic warheads, and nobody is really doing anything to to go on with this training for what we can observe.
Centralized storage, it doesn't mean that they are Moscow and beyond Urals. One of these storages, it was on Kharkov-Belgorod region frontline.
But nevertheless it is safely locked and the task of making preparations for a real time use of non-strategic warheads is rather complicated. You need a lot of untrained heads on extremely sensitive assets. It is not so many of these officers who are going to be performing these tasks, would be very hesitant to follow this order, so it is not that easy for Mr Putin to give this order. It's not about pushing the proverbial red button.
And strategic weapons, you're asking about. Yes that's a different story. They are in a generally in...
Howard: ICBMs...
Baev: ...ICBMs and strategic submarines for that matter. They are in situation of readiness. That's about the red button and a very short chain of command, but they are unsuitable for the situation.
Howard: So this idea that Putin might use tactical nuke in Ukraine... You would have to see signs of that first.
Baev: Yes.
Howard: In other words he's just not going to start throwing tactical nukes. He's going to do some messaging first, right?
Baev: It's not only messaging...
Howard: By blowing up Nord Stream.
Baev: Blowing up Nord Stream in this regard is an interesting exercise in the kind of hybrid war, where you probably bombed your own assets in order to send the message. I don't think we probably can well...
Howard: What a nuclear test in Novaya Zemlya? Would that be... If you were looking for a sign that he's getting ready to use nukes, they've long been suspected of not testing nuclear weapons and there's been expectations they might do something in Novaya Zemlya. So that would be what you were kind of panic.
Baev: Yes. There were also talking simulations and experiments with micro, micro… But you really need to test one of the warheads which were on the store for that long time. Nuclear test would be very clear sign of preparations and also a message in its own right which is certain degree the big resonance, but it's also not something you can do very fast. Moving nuclear warhead to Novaya Zemlya you cannot hide in modern technologies. It is again the rather complicated logistical operation.
So one of my propositions is that there is no nuclear first use, because I agree that with this course coming from uh Washington DC, that any attempt of nuclear use will be catastrophic for Russia, very probable. And since I want to think about non-catastrophic options I break that out.
My second condition is rather more, even more, I would say, problematic because I think that until Putin remains in power Russia is firmly set on the path of national catastrophe. If you want to think about non-catastrophic options, it means no Putin. How it's going to happen, that's a different line of uh of argument. Russian history provides all sorts of examples, but logically when a very large part of Russian leadership, it's plain clear that the problem is of colossal proportion and the central part of the problem is that particular person, a way to remove that central part of the problem will be found. It's hard to say how, but it may happen very soon as the disaster in Kherson would strike. There will be a need to explain away the defeat in the war. The easiest way to explain it is to pin it on a person, that it's Putin's worth that is responsible, it's his degree.
That's the way forward for any possible leadership and that opens up all sorts of opportunities for Ukraine, for the West, but also opens up all sorts of side effects in Russia's immediate neighborhood and all these dynamics would inevitably interplay. Ukraine might be very tempted to exploit the attempt, to exploit the opportunity of Russia's weakness, to press harder.
The development of Putin's removal would be a huge shock in Belarus for that matter when Lukashenko is so personally dependent on, that a new explosion of protests in Belarus is entirely probable and the enforcers, Lukashenko’s security services will be quite demoralized with what happened in Moscow. We now know that the protests of 2020 had very little chance of success simply because Russia was there with capabilities to do the same thing as now doing in Ukraine. These capabilities are now spent. No help is coming from Moscow even if the post-Putin leadership would fancy that.
There will probably be many troubles in the Caucasus. Some of these troubles are already starting. We see the new tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan going on. Azerbaijan is very keen to exploit its position of power with the help of Turkey, but that's a little bit in a particular case. We have Chechnya where Ramzan Kadyrov positions himself as Putin's infantry man. Without Putin he will be able to play his own game. It's Georgia who's lost control over its two provinces will be pressing hard to get them back, and again Chechnya might come into that frame.
And now this is going to see the instability that might be happening in Central Asia where we have seen very recently clashes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where Russia used to play a role of security provider of kind, including earlier this year in Kazakhstan. No chance for playing this role anymore. So there will be impacts coming on Moscow from these directions
The new post-Putin leadership [would be] quite probably collective leadership. I don't think any single person would step into into his shoes. [It] will be very unstable. There will be all sorts of shifts and changes in this leadership as we saw after Stalin's death probably. And again the desire to put responsibility on that person, to hold this person responsible for the loss of Belarus will be obviously there.
It is possible to expect that the new post-Putin leadership would be more conservative, more nationalistic, more kind of hard driven, but any leadership will have to deal with the unfolding disaster in the economy, in the neighborhood, in Ukraine. And you know this is a situation where any kind of leadership will be pressed to make new, new and new compromises with Ukraine, with the West, in the neighborhood. So there is a path there, path of compromises which can be incentivized by the West, which can be compelled by the West in a different categories.
We genuinely know all these people who are now there in Moscow, in the Kremlin’s proverbial corridors. They are not really, any of them, statesmen of very incredible profile. They're all very corrupt. They're all very dirty. It will be no fun to do business with them. Nevertheless it's still a much different game from negotiating with Mr. Putin who is so obsessed with Ukraine, who is so paranoid about the West, who is so self-centered. And I think obsession with his own health, which obviously increased during the long self-isolation, makes it next to impossible to have a meaningful conversation with him, not not to mention deal. It will be different with post-Putin leadership. Yes, we know these characters. They will try to play a hard ball in any case, but they will be also very interested in regaining access to their own fortunes sanctioned by the West, which makes it a little bit easier to incentivize them, to make compromises on the most important theater in Ukraine, to go, you know, make this concession, death concession, starting certainly with the returning to start February 23, proceeding further. And I think the main problem on this track of radio compromises will be Crimea. That is a case which is very difficult to handle for Russia. A lot of emotions attached to that not only on Ukrainian side, but on the Russian side as well. If it will be possible to postpone the solution of this problem for some time in the near future, it will make progress on other tracks much easier.
One my last point is about China. In this city is always a question: “and what about China?” And my point is that in this development China is pretty much irrelevant as it has been irrelevant in the seven months of this war. It is sitting on the fence, is saying something positive to Putin, but not really making any material difference. They want this war to end as soon as possible. They didn't like the start of the war. They didn't like the course of the war. Yes, China will, uh, personally will be very upset with Putin's departure, but generally said it doesn't change much. China wouldn't be able to make much difference on this track. Counterintuitive as it might seem. It seems kind of changing such a great power. It always makes a difference. Probably we need to start thinking about China not as a rising power, but as a stagnant power, and that's a difference.
And I will stop here. That's more time than it was allocated to me, but then I was delayed with technicalities.
Howard: That's fine. Wonderful! Thank you very much. Andrei, are we on this course for a post-Putin collective leadership. I mean this is… He raises a very interesting question about the future of Russia. And what about the impact on the economy and mobilization? What's on your mind? What is right now? What is making you think about this in a different way?
Illarionov: First of all, Glenn, thank you very much for inviting me to this interesting panel. I have a chance to share with colleagues and friends my thoughts on current development.
You asked me about the post-Putin Russia and so on. I don't share this view. I think that we are quite far from this stage yet. And since we are not there and frankly speaking I don't see that we'll be there anytime soon,. So with your permission I would try to spend some of our time to attract the attention of colleagues to the nature of this war first, and what nature of this war in some periods of this war would tell us about the state of mind in the Kremlin. I would prefer to use… This term is better than Russia because practically it's only the Kremlin…
Howard: Is it correct to call it the party of war when you talk about Kremlin?
Illarionov: I would prefer Kremlin, and after that I would discuss which parties do exist there and what is the difference between them. So far we can see, what you can see? It is more or less a consolidated position, so we cannot hear much about diverse position or different views. We do not hear that Mr Patrushev would express something very different from Mr Putin, or that Mr Medvedev would be slightly different, but it's a different story.
But nevertheless let's come, first of all, to better understand the war. I think it's very important. I would start with a shorter remark concerning the title of our session which is as you can see in the first part the war in Ukraine. I do see very clearly an act of the Kremlin propaganda war which is intact on the wonderful, beloved and respectful Jamestown Foundation. This is exactly the term…
Howard: This is Janusz's book…
Illarionov: Right, our best friends have been under impact of this propaganda machine because… Not, but in Janusz's book I don't see this. I see the Guide to Russia's Rupture, but I don't see "war in Ukraine", but the "war in Ukraine" is the very term…
Howard: "Russia's rupture"?
Illarionov: Not, but "war in Ukraine", this term is the Kremlin's term because the Kremlin wants us around the world to think that this is a Ukrainian War or in the worst case War in Ukraine. They do not like the real term which is "war against Ukraine" or "Russian-Ukrainian war" or "Russian war against Ukraine" or "Kremlin war against Ukraine". And this is very important. They are persistent in using this term, and actually many Western journalists and experts and politicians are for shortness using the term "war in Ukraine" which is in substance absolutely wrong. Because it is not the Ukraine War. Ukraine didn't start this war. Ukraine is the victim of this aggression, and just by doing this the Kremlin is trying, some kind of, to deviate attention, to move attention from the real aggressor, real launcher of this war to the victim of this war. That's why I would suggest our friends and colleagues try to avoid Kremlin's terminology which sometimes is much easier to use like they did with the Russian-Georgian War. They preferred to call it the Five-Day War. It's another, some kind of linguistic aggression against the victims of aggression. So this was the Russian-Georgian War or the Kremlin's War against Georgia. Here we are dealing with the Kremlin's War against Ukraine or the Russian-Ukrainian War as the best case. So, this is my very first remark.
Second my remark would be concerning stages of this war. So far I see three main stages of this war. The first stage was probably from February 24…
This is the last period of this long Russian-Ukrainian War, because we understand that the Russian-Ukrainian War was launched on February 20, 2014 with the beginning of operation. The minister Shoigu has coined the particular medal for the liberation of Crimea, and he just mentioned the beginning of this war: February 2014. I'm talking about a conventional war against Ukraine. Conventional war of Russia or the Kremlin against Ukraine was launched on February 20, 2014. So, this has been going on for more than 8 years, 8.5 years.
So, now we are talking about the last stage of this war which was launched on February 24, 2022. You might be talking about a particular period of this stage of the war. So I see three main periods.
The first period of this latest stage of the war is from February 24 until late March. I would call it for myself a blitzkrieg. It's the plans of striking or non-striking hits against Ukraine, to capture a substantial portion of Ukrainian government, to decapitate Ukrainian government, to capture Kiev. We all know this. So this is the first period.
The second period was from late March up to September 21, and I call this the war of attrition. And through this period it was quite clear that Putin was absolutely ready for long term warfare. According to a number of documents that appeared for more than five-month period it appears that he prepared for at least a three-year war until the beginning or mid of 2025. And if one looks at the so-called Grand Deal concluded in Istanbul, the duration of this deal is three years. If we look at the number of foreign exchange reserves of the Russian Central Bank, they are going to be used with the current speed of expenses approximately for three more years. There are many other indications that Putin was prepared and was ready for relatively low intensity warfare compared to the first period, compared to blitzkrieg, so, for the long of attrition.
And the second period can be divided into two subperiods. The first subperiod would be the war of attrition with the Russian offensive which continued approximately until August 26. And the war of attrition with the Ukrainian counteroffensive started on August 26 until today.
But the third period of war, seems to me, has been launched on September 21 with Putin's speech, infamous speech with decisions on referendums in the occupied territories, with mobilization, with nuclear threats again at a new level and so on. And we need to understand why all of sudden after 5 months of attrition which looked suitable for Putin, all of sudden he has changed radically his views, his mindset, and he completely changed his attitudes and his policy towards the war, because the third period can be called, whatever, a final blew or something like that. His preparations for something like that overblowing attack again at Ukraine with all possible forces including nuclear, including Belarusian territory, including mobilization of additional 300,000 or 500,000 or 1,000,000 or several million people. It's absolutely different from what we have seen in the previous five months.
So, we need to understand what happened, because it's a radical change of the strategy of the war. I would mention several points that would be helpful in the understanding. First of all, all this bunch of actions which we have heard about happened within three days: from September 19 to September 21, neither before or after some kind of corrections, additions, attachments, but nothing so. All decisions announced within these three days. So it means…
And even just for example such a decision on referendum week before. All Kremlin mass media have been told that the referendum would be held at the least at the end of the year or might be in year 2023. And everybody was preparing for something like that. For example, the captured documents of the Kharkov referendum clearly stated that the referendum in the Kharkov region should be held on November 1 to November 7. There was no talk of any referendums from September 23 to September 27…
Howard: Some of the captured documents from Kharkov?
Illarionov: No, it is Ukrainians that captured documents on preparation for the Kharkov referendum…
Howard: Which city? Kharkov?
Illarionov: Kharkov region. Kharkov has not been captured and hopefully will never be captured. But in the Kharkov region they prepared very detailed documents on how to organize the referendum, in all details how to prepare. Definitely, we know the results of the referendum, they published them already, but they were saying that the referendum would be held on November 1 to November 7, and they published the number of people that would participate, and the number of people that would vote "yes" - everything is already known. So, what we know, they were planning in the best case in November, not in October, not even in September. And in other regions they were talking about either December or next year. That's why something… And this was really, you know, on September 13, you can see in Russian media, talking about referendums next year.
So, it means that something has happened within a very short period of time after September 13 and before September 19. What exactly might happen within that short period of time? And because this bunch of decisions was announced on September 19-21, that's why the latest time such decisions could be taken is September 17 to September 18. What is this date? This is the date when Mr Putin returned from Samarkand, from the summit of Shanghai Security Organization [Shanghai Cooperation Organization] and that means that the decisions, the basic strategic decisions, that he has taken with himself and with his friends and colleagues and his encourage, it has been heavily influenced [by] what he has learned, what he has heard, what he has been recommended, for what he interpreted in Samarkand. And definitely we can look into some account and we can think about who might influence Mr Putin's decision-making process. And probably it would be not hard to make a conclusion that this problem was a chairman of China...
Howard: So you think it was China
Illarionov: It was Xi Jinping and the discussion with him and the conversation with him. And if actually, if you look into the two press releases, that Kremlin published and China published, a Chinese office, it's a very play inconsistencies, kind of mismatch from of these two press releases, which actually supported this view that it was a conversation with Xi Jinping that has very substantial influence on the Putin's decision-making process. And since then we have seen…
We can look for example for press releases of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. It's very clear saying what is China's position on the Russian-Ukrainian war, and it's, it's now, it's not, we don't need to kind of to fantasize, it's kind of its official statement of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs: "China would like to finish this war as soon as possible." That's very clear statement. And moreover today Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs actually published something that I never seen before. China's Minister for Foreign Affairs published the statement in which they call, China called Ukraine as a strategic partner of China. And in the conversation between our Putin and Xi Jinping Putin was talking about strategic relations between Russia and China, and the response from XI Jinping was rather cool, rather cold and [he] said, "Okay, we would probably use some kind of contact, strategic contact like telephone conversation." So it's a very different meaning of the word "strategic". So and from…
And one more important moment needs to be mentioned. And Mr Patrushev, Security Council's Secretary of Russia, has been immediately dispatched from Moscow to Beijing on, probably in the night, from the night of September 17th to September 18th. And he arrived in Beijing late afternoon uh September 18th and held these conversations and negotiations with the Chinese Partners. It looks like he has, he was informing the Chinese side about the decisions that have been taken in Moscow day before. And according to all again, all these press releases, it would like that just Putin promised to comrad Xi to inform him about his decision. And the best way to do it, he sent Mr Patrushev to Beijing to do this business, and that is because he was envisioning on September 18th and 19th. It was exactly before those decisions have been announced in Moscow, especially assuming the time difference between Beijing and Moscow.
So all together, taken all together it looks like that in the conversation between uh Putin and Xi Jinping it was, I don't know what is the kind of the style and the form and the shape of this conversation, but it looks like it has been said, it was recommended, it was expressed as a desire or wish or something like that that this war should be finished as soon as possible. Having got on this information from his so-called "strategic partner" Mr Putin uh came to the conclusion that he could not get for example weapons from China. As we know China does not provide weapons to Russia.
Mr Putin looks like he decided to move to the much faster conclusion of second kind of settlement, some kind of deal and just to preserve the best possible conditions for that deal. He tried to raise ttakes as much as possible as high as possible with mobilization, with his speech, with a referendum, with a threat of nuclear [war], just to scare as much as possible not so much Ukraine, because we understand Ukrainians are not scared even of nuclear threats and they're ready to fight regardless what will be, what will happen with them, but scare as much as possible the Western partners of Ukraine, including the current US Administration and some other governments in Europe, just to force them to use their pressure on Ukrainian government and on the Ukrainian society and Ukrainian military force to be ready to some settlements, some deal. And that is why he's an… He understands that probably at this moment Russian troops has captured most of Ukrainian territory and it would be rather hard to get more uh territory. So that is why it's necessary to fix what they've gotten already because it would be rather hot, very bloody and maybe not guaranteed to get something more.
So that is why what we have seen over the last whatever 10 days or so, it looks like it is a.. Once again this is a version, it's not a guarantee, I was not in Kremlin those days, okay. So it looks like that it is a lost attempt of its kind of the most, the most the seriously prepared - it went over highest possible - bluff, possible, highest possible blackmail of the Western partners and allies of Ukraine in order to achieve exactly what chairman Xi Jinping suggested, but on his Putin's terms. So it might be the kind of the movable movement, moving to the finalization of this conflict, but on his terms. So that's at least my reading of the current events. And the current reconstruction of the larger railway also adds to that element. This is an element of psychological warfare: just to scare as much as possible and that is why to exhort the best possible conditions for potential settlement.
So stopping with these three periods I will just probably comment a little bit on what Pavel has said because my view about that is slightly different from yours, and just let's discuss what is common and what is different.
So I don't think that Russia is losing the war, and I don't think that Russia is having this slow moving defeat. So far seems to me it if we look just purely military point of view, so it just does not look that the war itself, the military warfare has reached a turning point. We don't know yet because we can know it only post factum, we cannot do it in the process. Only after some events happen so we can say yes or no, but for the moment we don't see that the line of… Frontline did not change much with one exceptional particular counteroffensive which is again not clear Ukrainian victory. This is an organized retreat of the Russian troops done according to Putin's order.
That's absolutely clear that political decision to to remove to withdraw all Russian troops from from Kharkov region, west of Oskol River without fight, such important centers like Kupiansk, a railway center and a road center has been given to Ukrainians without a single shot. Such important something like Izium with the concentration, with the territory that should be used as attack in the rear of Ukrainian forces in Donbas, has been given without a single shot. In coupon there was a headquarters of three armies: two some kind of the regular whatever infantry armies, on the other the 1st Guard Tank Army, the best time coming in the whole Russian forces. So that substantial centers have been given to Ukrainians without a single shot. Moreover if you look into the north of the Kharkov region like Velikyi Burluk, Volchansk and Kozacha Lopan, that's a very substantial, defensive construction that have been created by Russian forces during six months of occupation Ukrainian troops, were 80 kilometers from those those positions, they have been debuggled by Russian troops. So not only without any shots. Ukrainians were 80 kilometers from those places, and they have been abandoned and left to Ukrainians
So all these suggests very clearly that it was a political decision by Kremlin, by Putin to liberate, okay, those territories and withdraw troops.
Baev: Liberate usually Ukrainians…
Illarionov: Right, in both ways it would be correct, okay. Literally okay.
So, and also probably the last point here I would use. I would mention that I just… If we look at the number and the content of what the Ukrainians were able to capture during the uh this Kharkov counteroffensive looks like 10, in the best case 15 of the equipment that Russian troops get in this region. So between 85 to 90 percent of equipment Russians withdrawn and almost all troops withdrew without substantial losses and was without POW. So that is why it was organized retreat, according to the Putin's part. If it will be interested we can discuss why he shouldn't do it, he did it.
So my probably last point here will be about military operations since I don't see the turning point in the war. And this is a very important element whether kind of the tide of war moved, still on the Russian side or moved to the Ukrainian side. I still don't see turning points so far, and I would see such a turning point if and when not something that will happen with Lyman because it's a secondary or even secondary layer of the front. It's not important strategically regardless of how much blood has been spent over there. Not even Kherson, not even the kind of the right Bank of Dnieper. The most important center of gravity of this war is Melitopol, Berdiansk and Mariupol. So that is why the most important for everybody to look into the line of Russian defense or Russian offensive between Vasylivka on Kakhovka reservoir on Dnieper to Polohyi, to Donetsk. This is almost straight line from West to East, and this is the most line, the most important line in this world. If Ukrainians would be able to break this line and to get to Melitopol, to liberate Berdiansk and maneuver and to get to the Sea of Azov that would be a sign of the turning point in this war, that would be verification that the tide of war shifted to Ukrainian's favor. Thank you.
Howard: You had a very interesting point about organized retreat because one of the things, that I asked my Ukrainian friends about, was with this Kharkov offensive, counter-offensive. Why is it, if there, if it was a defeat and seizure of so much territory it would say 3 000 kilometers of territory…
Illarionov: 8 000.
Howard: but if why don't we see videos of Russian captured POWs, because you would expect to the you would see many many videos of. If it's a successful counteroffensive you're going to see a lot of POWs. Obviously, but they did there weren't any. And so what you said was an a very interesting point. I haven't heard anybody kind of argue that it was an organized retreat. Now that sounds good, maybe from the kremlin's public relations perspective, but that's a fair point, what you say. So that's something you know to take into consideration.
Well stop on that note because we have a a many diverse perspectives here today, and so we're going to have another perspective, because you know many believe that the war is at a turning point now or maybe the Kharkov counteroffensive was a turning point. No more and certainly the Kherson offensive is and will be a decisive moment in the war. But with the mobilization occurring inside of Russia you have 80 000, close to 100 000 Russians going to Kazakhstan to avoid mobilization order. 50 000 flooding Georgia. The impact on the economy in Russia losing all this very intellectual capital, people leaving their jobs, because they're afraid to serve and to fight and die and don't boss, certainly doesn't look well for the future of Russia.
So on that note and given Janusz's title of his new book as a Guide to Russia's Rupture, he raises a fair point about the Kremlin war against Ukraine. What does it mean for Russia, Janusz?
Bugajski: Yeah, if I could add to Andrei, it's not a possibility which is a disorganized retreat, and it reminds me a little bit of how Serbs fled the Kraina after occupying here for several years and then when confronted by a much more superior force. In this particular area they actually fled. I mean not in a particularly organized way, but anyway they could, even having a loyal population.
But to answer your question, Glenn… I'm sorry. My book is not here. Maybe it was hijacked by the FSB for a book burning event. I don't know. But let me highlight, sort of, five points.
Howard: And the book is available online on Jamestown’s website for all of us watching today.
Bugajski: PDF, and there'll be a Ukrainian version coming out in October as well, in Kiev.
But let me make sure I've got 15 minutes so let me make about Five Points, about the book because I just want to outline it. By the way, I finished a book three weeks before Russia's extended invasion of Ukraine. The editor allowed me to make some limited updates, but I I do believe actually the war reinforced many of the points, my thesis in the book and it's actually exacerbated Russia's internal faders, accelerated them.
So let me start with one, the first one. Russia's weak foundations. People ask me [about] Russia, “Isn't Russia too big to fail?” Well, it's actually smaller than the Soviet Union which was a much more powerful country than the Russian Federation. Russia's rupture, I don't think will happen overnight. I think Pavel has mentioned this. But it has so many of the ingredients for a prolonged period of dissolution. It's been unable to transform itself into a nation-state, a civic state, it's not even a stable imperial state as we've seen its actions abroad. It's driven by disputes internally between statist imperialists, ethno-nationalists, Soviet restorers, panslavists, eurasianists, not even to mention all the liberals, democrats, federalists, regionalists. It has numerous economic demographic and social weaknesses which I do detail in the book, and they've been intensified, I would say, by convergence of factors: overdependence on fossil fuel exports; contracting economy particularly in the light of sanctions; stark socio-economic inequalities; demographic decline especially among key sectors of the population, and depopulation outside of European Russia; widening disparities between Moscow and diverse republics and regions; suppression of ethnic and regional identities, a precarious, increasingly precarious, I'd say, political pyramid based on personism and clientalism; deeply distrust of government institutions. increasing public alienation from a corrupt and self-serving ruling elite; escalating military casualties and war expenditures and of course economically damaging international sanctions which, as Pavel mentioned, are going to have to be revised to the extent of the damage that we envisage.
Now the question of energy exports as well. It's something that maybe are two experts here to talk about as well, but certainly I would say that Europe is weaning itself away from dependence on Russian energy regardless of whether Nord Strom 2 was sabotaged or not, and it's, if it was, then I think it's a perfect demonstration of Russia sawing off the branch that it has been sitting on.
Second point. What are Russia's alternatives? I believe that in the midst of crippling economic sanctions and potential military defeat… And we can argue what defeat means and how long it would take. I think the hopes among liberals that Russia can develop into a democracy and remain intact appears, I believe, it's increasingly illusory. Support for the Putin regime may be strong. We don't know if it is. We don't know how deep it is. I think it can shift rapidly among a disoriented and currently largely passive or fearful public, but there is little evidence that Russia is on the verge of a peaceful democratic upsurge. I think much more likely is a series of institutional and intra-elite struggles over power and resources which we may actually already be witnessing in various mysterious deaths of officials, oligarchs, simmering disputes over the conduct of the war between military and FSB, as well as increasing public and regional disquiet in the light of Moscow's economic failures and its recent mobilization. Putin's ouster whenever it happens can itself contribute to the turmoil and precipitate even more widespread political and social conflicts. There could be some collective leadership, but we don't remember having Communist party anymore that kept a lot of this together in the past. That's gone. I think that if internal security seems to be weakening and the war in Ukraine is failing, we may witness military mutinies, angry armed veterans returning from the front with the prospects for violence, crime, sabotage and ungovernability spreading. And when the state is viewed as weak, as weakly, where it cannot provide security, the vacuum will be filled by alternatives.
My third point. In terms of the rupture I'm not going to go into too much detail because it's outlined very extensively in the book. But let me just make this one point at a strategic level. The extensive invasion of Ukraine and seizure of territory shows that Russia.. Let's say Russia. You're right, Andrei, Kremlin. The Kremlin does not respect the international borders of any neighboring states. However I would say this imperial overage can rebound on Russia itself as the country's external and internal borders will also become increasingly disputed by various republics, regions, as well as by some neighbors. If Crimea and Donbas can re-separate from Russia, then why not other territories seized by Moscow in the past, particularly as the state continues to weaken? And I think that the nature of the rupture itself (I go into a lot of detail over a couple of chapters in the book) will be very diverse. In some cases it will be peaceful. In some cases violent. A mixture of both the Soviet and Yugoslav scenarios, both of which I remember very vividly in the 1990s. I’m going to detail because I’ve kind of chronicled all this in my book.
But what will emerge from it? We may have long-term chaos in some places. We may have some states emerging, seeking International legitimacy. Some states or regions may form loose confederations. It has been the history of this in the past during the breakdown of the tsarist empire in particular, during the long Civil Wars within the former Russian Empires. Several may become involved in territorial and ethnic conflicts as we are still witnessing in parts of the Western Balkans, the South Caucasus, in Central Asia, where territory, the correspondence between territory and ethnicity still has not been settled.
Fourth, Western policy. And I do develop a whole chapter to this. I think we should be making contingency plans for a very disruptive period in which, you know… The war in Ukraine's the one thing, but it all… I say the attack on Ukraine is one thing, but what will precipitate in Russia itself?
I don't think we're prepared for, and there are both dangers and opportunities how to handle this without being directly involved and being blamed for the conflict. Now I think Western approach is based on these persistent fears about Russia's state failure, about its dissolution. That's one of the reasons we didn't argue quite properly at the beginning, you know. This sort of piecemeal drip, drip by drip, a drop by drop or drip by drip assistance to Ukraine whereas they were crying out for the sort of weaponry that they have now so they could prevent further capture of territory. I think one of the reasons is there was a fear of Russia which, I think, is the real russophobia, fear of Russia somehow dissolving. And it reminds me of the profound anxieties that I was here in Washington in the early 90s. The anxieties displayed by the US government and other governments during disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 90s. So I think basing policy on the avoidance of particular consequences is very counterproductive. It encourages the Kremlin or empowers the Kremlin to exploit Western fears to its advantage. In reality I think Moscow would be less capable of projecting its Imperial agenda when its military capabilities reduced, its economic resources diminished, elite power struggles intensified, state institutions challenged and citizens less acquiescent.
So last point. What is to be done? I think first of all Russia's European neighbors must be provided with all upgraded security instruments and weapon systems to shield themselves from any destabilizing scenarios that Moscow may attempt to engineer to deflect attention from its own implosion. And I think they will do that for sure, you know, to strike at neighbors. I'm not sure whether they're going to provoke NATO or not. That would be, I suppose, foolhardy. And I don't think they're about to commit suicide. Nevertheless there could be acts of sabotage. There could be some provocations against neighbors. I think that Russia's offensive capabilities already crippled in Ukraine will further deteriorate when the defensive capabilities of U.S allies and partners are strengthened now.
Western policy makers, I think, must also benefit from Russia's internal vulnerabilities. Look, Moscow will claim and it has been for years that Washington is trying to break up Russia. You know this in the 90s, not just the Soviet Union, but the Russian Federation. So no amount of denial will change that accusation. It's like denying that NATO threatens it. If they want to believe it, they're going to believe it or they act as though they believe it anyway. So it doesn't make any difference. So instead of these pointless verbal defensiveness which one hears from various Western administrations I think we need to seize the marathon, seize the narrative as something positive, as you did during the Cold War.
We need to go on the PR offensive. Russia needs democracy, pluralism, regional devolution and genuine federalism to save its economy and re-establish relations with a rich and powerful West. And if a democratic transformation becomes improbable, Washington will support the rights of republics and regions to determine their own sovereignty and statehood as it did relatedly with the Soviet Republics. Now again this can help at least some citizens within Russia, demonstrate that they are not isolated on the world stage, but it will take that narrative away from the Kremlin that's always accuse the russophobes that are attacking them, not their own policies that are driving this country towards disaster.
So again, I'm not going to go into details of how I envisage the different breakups. Very last point, I would say, is seeing the future. Do not fear it. We were not prepared for the collapse of the Soviet bloc or the Soviet Union and we were very slow to offer support and cooperation. I would say, even the countries that are emerging from the Soviet bloc were very fearful of what the Soviets could do. I don't think they realized the independence and the strength that they were accumulating. I remember even in Poland they were very wary about joining NATO, what would be the Russian reaction, would you want us. So we've got to seize the initiative.
And the last point, I would say. The formation of new states from failed empires is the process visible throughout history when loyalty to the existing state dissipates in new forms of sovereignty increasingly supported. It is worth remembering that only a few years before its collapse communism was evidently invincible, and the Soviet Union was engaged in numerous foreign policy escapades. It controlled half of Europe. It trumpeted its economic superiority over the West while disguising its growing existential crisis. And I think Russia is a much weaker state whose decline accelerates each day and whose status quo is merely transient. So let me stop that. Thank you.
Howard: Great points going forward, Janusz, for us to consider and think about. I'm not… I'm sure of these… We don't know which direction it's going, but that leads me to ask Pavel and Andrei about Russian perspectives. It certainly led to mobilization and some opposition in Dagestan and other places. And then reports today that Kadyrov is going to send his forces into Dagestan to enforce the mobilization which won't sit well with many Dagestanian. By that I mean Dagestan is a multi-ethnic republic, but you can't make that argument, right? Andre and Pablo, I mean that there's certain the mobilization is going to cause social friction and discontent.
Baev: Yes, absolutely. And you know, signs of this friction and discontent are plentiful. And I think it's not only the mobilization as such which came as a shock for the Russian society, which causes all sorts of rupture particularly since in some republics like I don't know Buryatia, like Tuva. A lot of male population is in fact drafted in the republics are becoming on the verge of demographic catastrophe, but it came as a huge shock to Moscow where, you know, all the state discourse was “The Special Operation was going according to plan. No need for any change.” Then mobilization entirely unprepared, much the same way as the launch of the war against Ukraine, wasn't entirely prepared, came with the show. Now we have this in a second shock. What is going to reinforce this shock is how the mobilization is proceeding. You know, complete lack of infrastructure for mobilization, complete lack of military capacity to take in those reluctantly recruited people who are going to generate feedback and to their families. The lack of food, the lack of uniforms, a lack of training, you know, everything. So I think that the social dynamics is triggered by this decision on mobilization. We might see a snowballing effect in that. So I think it's a major mistake not only in announcing mobilization, but in announcing it in this particular way, unprepared, unjustified, after all the kind of reassurances that the special operation in Ukraine was on track despite the evidence.
I'm not entirely in agreement with Andrei's point about the Ukraine war. First of all, the Kremlin is not pushing the idea about the Ukraine war. It's still a “special operation”. The word “war” is still not used even after Putin's speech 10 days ago. I'm not sure he will use this word tomorrow. So it's still not “war” but as far as…
Illarionov: “Special operation in Ukraine”...
Baev: Yes, but…
Illarionov: …or “Ukrainian special operation”.
Baev: …but it wasn't that the term Ukraine war implies anything negative regarding Ukraine. I don't see so. We have the Opium War and we had Crimean War and we had the Vietnam War which generally are just useful terms. It's not really any negative connotation. it doesn't really put any blame on Ukraine. It's just a term. Where the war is happening? In Ukraine.
Illarionov: Okay, if I may, just it is important because it distracts attention from the initiator of the war. Initiator of the war is the Kremlin, initiator of the war is Putin, initiator of the war is Russia, whatever if you even like it. That is why just calling this war Ukrainian War or Special Operation or what in your brain, it distracts attention from the real instigator of all these bloodshed and all this crime. So that is why it's necessary in all reasonable discussion just to… And it’s kind of a tradition. We have different names for wars. Opium War it's not about the territory, it’s about the product, but in the Middle Ages we had the Hundred Years’ War…
Baev: [unclear]
Illarionov: …what's essentially… England and France at that time were not a kind of final national states as they became later. But now over the last couple of centuries so mostly the wars being called by names of participants, if not the world war, okay? So that is why I would suggest…
Baev: We now have more…
Illarionov: Okay, because there are more participants. But now that, kind of, we have two very clear: the aggressor and the victim of aggression. So that is why I would insist that it would be a much better title for these military conflicts, as well as for the Russian-Georgian conflict. Not the Five-Day War, but Russian-Georgian. And actually we know that it was not five days. It would be just a real study of the history of the war. So that is why this war has been going on for eight and a half years already and we don't know how long it will continue. So this is a Russian-Ukrainian War or Kremlin-Ukrainian War or Putin's war against Ukraine, just whatever. But we should not forget about the instigator, about who launched this war, about who started the war first.
So, disorganized retreat. We have no sign, no confirmation that retreat was disorganized. Almost all troops with very few really singular exceptions left the Kharkov region. The equipment that was left in the Kharkov region is outdated or worn up or, so kind of, not used or not movable. So just it's kind of with very few exceptions, so they took all reasonable and ready equipment. And even by size, once again, they left between 10 and, the worst case, 15 percent of equipment. So that is why they did not leave neither personnel, nor equipment. So it was a very well organized retreat, and once again it is a shocking comparison for example this battle over Lyman that is actually going on. It started exactly on the same day because it wasn't according to Ukrainian military planning. It was a pincer operation. One operation was north of Balakleya from the West to East towards Kupyansk, and another pincer from south taking Lyman and cutting off Russian troops west of Oskol River. So and in the same region, not only talking about what's going on in Kherson or what's going in Bakhmut, but in the same region Russians retreated not having produced any substantial resistance which was Balakleya, Shirokino, to Kupyansk, to Izium, to [unclear], and so on. We saw how a bloody battle was unfolding and still is going on over Liman, the same district. So that's why no sign of disorganization or fall of morale or some kind of inability to wage the war. Nothing. It was a very deliberate decision of Putin to liberate this northern part of all. It was kind of the northeastern part of the region and to keep the Liman and so on.
Baev: Evacuate…
Illarionov: That’s mobilization. That's a very important point that everybody was discussing. Okay, today Carl Bildt has tweeted. This might be somebody already saw. According to his toll (somebody provided to him this number) 1.3 million people left Russia, but this 1.3 million people left from February 24th, not from last week. So certainly this, first of all, it is only just one way, but it did not say how many actually returns. So that is why what is necessary to look into the balance, not on the absolute demo... But even assuming that 1.3 million people, some kind of, were running from Putin's mobilization, Putin's war, and so on. Certainly it's not only them. For us also women and kids and kind of senior people, just all together. But even if we just consider these 1.3 million only men and only of the age that are some kind of ready for conscription or for participation in the military conflict, what is the official size of the Russian mobilization reserve? 18 million. We can check because it could be a larger number, but 18 million is a regular number. So even in this case the number of people in this particular age is 7%, and certainly it's an overinflated number. So essentially it was much lower. So it means that yes, okay, mobilization reserve for Russia has decreased essentially by three, four, and the worst case five percent. So 95% of the mobilization reserve is still there in Russia. So that is why… Yes… Can it have some impact on the capacity to mobilize?
Howard: There's a psychological capacity as well
Illarionov: Okay. Let's make first of all numbers, okay? Psychology is a different piece. I'm an economist. I was taught to do with numbers. So first of all numbers. Psychology is a different stuff.
So, Putin lost during all these iterations, okay, let's say, five percent of his mobilization reserve. Whether it affects his… Yes, it affects. Five percent less. But if he still has not 18 million, but 17 million, but okay like 16 million in reserves. But that's enough, and I'm just… We've seen all these reports about 300 000 that have been mobilized in the first day. We've seen reports that they plan to mobilize 500 000 before the end of the year, another 500.000 next year. I don't know whether it will happen, but this is feasible.
Howard: Well, there's another number that they only have capacity polygons that are only enough to train 60 to 90 thousand.
Illarionov: Not necessarily. They have a polygon in Ukraine, sell these people just to be killed. Once again…
Howard: If you have to train an army you do need a polygon. if you don't have places to train…
Illarionov: Once again, you are talking and thinking as a western person, completely western person. Just let me explain. Mr Putin does not care about this, okay? So he needs to... And we see those reports that people who have mobilized next day they haven't sent to the front.
Howard: True. Two days of training in [unclear].
Illarionov: Correct. So that is why he does not need polygons. So he needs only 18 million Kalashnikov guns. Does Russia have an 18 million collection of guns for the Americans? Yes. Yes, Russia has slightly more. So that is why I'm talking about, you know, the physical possibility to do it. Yes, this possibility does exist. Whether it will be used fully, we don't know yet. Whether Putin is doing much like a serious operation or is it a a huge unbelievable bluff just to scare the world we still don't know. We can have this as an option just to think about, but just from the purely some kind of numbers point of view yes, he has such a capacity.
Bugajski: Let me jump in with numbers also, Andrei. Giving the numbers and being very conservative, well let's say, 300 000 being mobilized. If 100 000 have already fled that's a third of those that could well be mobilized. So if you're saying they have 10 million people or maybe more, if a third flee because that's the proportion, that's not about three million people.
Illarionov: Those who fled, they fled before today. As you probably heard they're going to close the borders. That is why it would be much harder to flee. So even the answer… But if assume you're right, one third of those people will flee. Instead of 18 million, six million people will flee, there will be mobilization reserve of 12 million people. 12 million people if they would be mobilized (once again potentially, even though nobody mentioned this number) it would be more than enough. We know that all Ukrainian army have mobilization 700 thousand, so even the current standing Russian army, is people with the rifles, it's one million roughly, mobilization would add 300 000. So 1.3 million which is roughly speaking twice as many as Ukrainian forces right now. So it's a ratio 2:1. Even they will be with a very old, outdated, not very high level weapons, it still will be the army. It will not be perfect, I mean. But it will be Army and that army is able to kill.
Bugajski: And die.
Illarionov: And die, yes.
Baev: [unclear]
Illarionov: It's okay, but for Mr Putin it's not a problem. Let me tell you just enough
Howard: But it's also going against a very battle-tested hardened Ukrainian Army. Some of the very successful, morales high and some of the battle already…
Illarionov: This hardened Ukrainian Army died during this battle. We need to understand. Those people, who have mobilized, are also yesterday civilians. They were not ready for that. They certainly trained, they prepared, British helped a lot to, Poles certain amount of help, German started to train them.
Howard: Yes, and the British trained divisions in of ukrainians have not arrived on the battlefield yet.
Illarionov: Some of them.
Howard: They're on their way.
Illarionov: Some of them.
Howard: They're on their way.
Illarionov: At least I saw a report of some…
Howard: So you got, put and mobilize. You got British train ukrainians coming back or right?
Illarionov: Okay. The British promised to train about 10,000 in…
Howard: 14 months
Illarionov: Okay. Initially all right okay so uh 10,000 very well British trained Ukrainians versus 300,000 Russians not trained by British. We don't always know the result better, but we know the number. We saw that we could put it on. It's a very regular discussion or whatever in the general staff of the military just the quality versus quantity was a kind of quality of weapons and something. All of these arguments are relevant and nobody knows what would be the result because who will be right, who will be correct and what would be morale, what would be psychology, here is very important, we don't know. But we cannot ignore numbers. Numbers are very important because of the very big number of even poorly trained soldiers is still very big army, and it is very dangerous army.
Bugajski: So Andrei, let's jump numbers…
Baev: Numbers do not make an army. Numbers… You can probably find enough Kalashnikov machine guns, but you don't have much else.
Illarionov: Well, let me…
Baev: If you cannot feed them, you cannot equip them, there is no artillery for them, there is no tank, nobody is fighting this army, this war with Kalashnikov guns… I don't think many Kalashnikov guns were fit to fire. It's mostly artillery. It's mostly gunwear, other things. You cannot put this 300 000 as we imagine them as real army.
Illarionov: Let me just give one historical example. This is not Ukrainians versus Russians. It is Chinese versus Americans.
Howard: Yellow river, Korea…
Illarionov: Okay. Millions of very poorly trained Chinese with very bad or poor equipment, millions of them swept off North Korea and to get to the 53.
Mesu: That's a mistake, Andrei, because I'm a military historian. I studied Korean War, and the Chinese of course had the numbers, but they were well trained, well commanded, although
Illarionov: What is the ratio of Chinese troops versus whatever United Nations, American troops during this stage of the war?
Mesu: I mean during the famous November-December 1950 offensive.
Illarionov: No, no, no, no, not 1950, later.
Mesu: The Chinese achieved the breakthrough during the late November 1950 offensive. They managed to infiltrate their thousands of soldiers without anybody able to understand them. All the Chinese were well-trained, well-commanded. They might had poor quality weapons, but they used them effectively, especially motos. They didn't have radios, but they use the vessels. So they achieve as successful operator plan. They had a good plan, well-trained soldiers and the end result was the Americans and their allies suffered tremendous casualties
Illarionov: What is the ratio between the Chinese and American troops?
Mesu: When you are counting the ratio you should count the ratio at the front lines, forget about…
Illarionov: What is the ratio at the front?
Mesu: Well, 6:1.
Illarionov: Okay, 6:1.
Mesu: But don't forget the thing you are describing related with Russia is not an army, it's a horde.
Illarionov: Okay, it's your view. Here you have your right to have your view.
Howard: [unclear]
Mesu: I'm feeling you need to make use of your views. I mean you said for example the retreat from the Kharkiv region was well-organized. In a well-organized friendship no good army left-tailed weapons on damage. No good army left-tailed weapons stockpiles on damage, ammunition on damage. They left hundreds of tanks, and almost all of them according to the Russian standards the most modernized, well-developed tanks. I mean there are special internet sites like Oryx counting by the videos, photos the number of the lost Russian equipment. I mean, no war, as far as I know in modern history, we come across this kind of most lost equipment, lost weapons; and most of them were modernized weapons. In an organized retreat you destroy everything you had difficulty carrying. You destroy everything, and if you are not destroying at least you put some moving traps, mines, something else that when the enemy arrives to get hold of your weapon or ammunition it will be destroyed, exploded, etc. So what we are seeing is an army of completely disintegrated soldiers, not believing in their commanders, commanders not believing in their generals, generals not believing in the political leaders. What we are seeing is an army disintegrated in front of all eyes.
Nobody expected the rationale to be like that, but I'll tell you one thing. I worked with the Russian army when I was a young man. It was 2000-2001. The Russian army I worked with was so bad that I suffered difficulty to write reports about the condition. Of course one of the brigades was my brigade, very infamous one thanks to the First Chechen War, but the another one was paratroopers, VDV, and they were terrible in every aspect: soldiers beating their officers, low discipline, everything in shambles. And as you have observed I suffered huge difficulty in how we can report all these things. That was 2000-2001. I was expecting that the Russian army improved later but what we are witnessing in Ukraine it's not an army, it's a horde.
Howard: Okay, your points taken. Let Andrei finish his argument.
Illarionov: What's your name?
Mesu: Mesu. M, E, S, U.
Illarionov: Let me tell you. If you worked with the Oryx database, you would find that there were no working tanks even captured by Ukrainians. I work with this database on a daily basis, and you will find that during this operation from September 6th to September 13th the total number of tanks captured by Ukrainians not only in Kharkov, but in the whole frontline from Kharkov to Kherson was slightly more than 80. It was not even 100, but on all fronts. Total units of military equipment was 450. Again for the whole front, not only for this particular area. For this particular area it will be smaller, but…
Baev: Nowhere else…
Illarionov: Let me finish. No, no, no, it's always. If you follow this database on a daily basis, you will capture tanks, armored vehicles, artillery pieces that are just happening all the time. So that is why if you follow this, you will see it. And there's actually this level that I am giving you 450 of total units. This is the highest portable number that you can find because there are many military experts that come from each one with one by one, they're making them different numbers: "70 units have been captured", "80 units have been captured". Nobody, even I, at least I haven't seen anyone who would say that they were able to capture more than 100 units of all equipment, because if you check the numbers, you check…
Mesu: I'm not equal with you. It's not the same.
Illarionov: You get a top military expert.
[Unclear]
Illarionov: And now because we have these 450 units captured, destroyed, damaged for these three weeks, over one week from September 6th to September 30th. So now we can count how many units of military equipment have been in the Kharkov region. We don't know for sure, but based on the number of troops, based on the number of BTGs, based on the number of divisions and so on we arrive at this number. It will have between 3 to 4 thousands of different units: tanks, armored vehicles, artillery pieces, trucks and so on. So that is why you can get a very simple mess. These 450 units, if all of them happen to be in the Kharkov region, would be between 10 to 15 percent of all military equipment that have been in that area. It's very simple math. You can do it yourself.
So what I am saying, all this discussion about the quality of equipment, quality of the troops, psychology, morale, all of them very important, but please remember the basic formula of war. The basic formula of war includes all these elements plus numbers. Not only quality, but quantity of troops, quantity of military equipment and all the other characteristics. And that is why serious conversation and serious discussion should include all those elements, all those factors that you are mentioning and you mentioned, it is also important, but also numbers. You cannot ignore one part of the equation and just to work with the other part of the equation you need to work with all elements, all contributions to this equation.
So that is why my point is that yes, the Russian army and the Russian troops are not of some kind of great quality for the moment. Nobody doubts it. Nobody discusses it. But numbers matter. Number matters. A number of people were there. Just please remember that this whatever horde or whatever you would call this, this, I mean not army, was able to capture 20% of the Ukrainian territory. Ukrainians are much better trained, much better than whatever exists, but who captured the territory? Ukrainians captured Russian territory or Russians captured Ukrainian territory? Where is the frontline? We know where the frontline is. The frontline is… Almost all of Luhansk oblast is occupied by Russian troops. Okay, a substantial portion of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts are occupied by Russian troops. Russians are still fighting and trying to storm Bakhmut, they attack, they are in an offensive. So just it's not…
Howard: Yes, but Ukrainian [armed] forces say that they attack, and then two days later it's the Ukraine's counter-attack and then they retake what Russia…
Illarionov: We can discuss this…
Howard: But that's the only area on the front…
Illarionov: …now. But those hundreds of thousands did not arrive to the front here. So once again we got that
Howard: What's the next point you want to make? I mean just keep moving. I mean what other, what was your, other. Did you have another point you wanted to make?
Illarionov: No, I made this point
Howard: What about the mobilization and protests in Dagestan, burning recruitment centers? I mean what domestically? What is this is?
Illarionov: Okay, that happens in countries sometimes. The question whether it affects the political machine or administrative machine of Putin's regime. I doubt it because..
Howard: …no impact.
Illarionov: No, it does not mean no impact. It has some impact, but it does not have a great impact. And whatever they disrupt
Howard: What about the economic effect of all these men, the horde going into, leaving Russia and then also going in the army? What about the intellectual capital that Russia is losing economically?
Illarionov: In the war it is not important what will happen in five years time. What is important is what happens tomorrow, the day after tomorrow. So if Putin… And look at before this September 21st. Putin was ready for the War of Attrition for at least three years. Very clear indicators. If the question will be will Putin have enough forces, military personnel, equipment, troops, economic power, financial resources for three years of war. Yes, absolutely clear. Yes, no doubt, no doubt.
Moreover you were talking about the political stability. I would just mention what we all know. There was no case of the collapse of the totalitarian regime with whatever peaceful protests. Only with force.
Howard: No, that's a very, that's a good point. Yeah…
Illarionov: Since nobody is going to attack Russia, nobody going to use forces against Russia on the Russian territory, and we do not see any sign of military or some kind of any strengths, any force within Russia to do this, tell me what will be the source of disruption of this political regime in foreseeable future? Question mark.
Howard: No effect is what you're saying.
Illarionov: I'm saying limited effect that would not lead to disruption of this political regime.
Howard: Okay, you probably have a counter-response, Janusz. I want to take some questions from our guests. Also if you're watching and you want to ask a question, please do. Well, we have a section… Are you watching that? The question section. Yes, go right ahead.
Trevor: I have a question for Janusz actually, so…
Howard: Identify yourself.
Trevor: Oh sorry. My name is Trevor. I'm a writer at the National Interest, and my question is: if we get away from sort of the minutiae of the war and towards, you know, what you were talking about in your book on the potential for the the dissolution of Russia, it seems to me the way that you're talking about it is you don't sound very concerned about that, and I'm sort of wondering why not, because in the 90s when like people were talking about this, I guess, the prevailing attitude was either 1) this was going to turn into Yugoslavia, and you know all these ethnic groups are going to turn on each other or 2) there are all these nuclear weapons, the world's largest stockpile that, you know, some of them might have gone missing. And so has that changed? What's different between 1991 and 2022?
Bugajski: Yeah, I mean, what should I be concerned? The concern isn't a policy. One has to be prepared to manage something one doesn't control. We don't control what's going in Russia. We cannot control. I mean, indirectly we can because of sanctions helping Ukraine, on the military side helping to arm our allies and other partners, yes, but not directly within Russia. That's for the Russians. That's for the Russian citizens' side.
Look, what I do in the book is I outline all the contingencies, all the possibilities if there is a break in Russia of what it will mean for neighbors, what it will mean for neighboring countries, the historical relations between, across borders that will most probably rise to the forefront, how we should be prepared militarily because as I say Russia could actually, I wrote an article for National interest on this, that Russia could be at the same time as it as it is splintering, because it is undergoing major internal fracture, could hit out at neighbors, so for which we should be prepared, which NATO should, which we should be prepared with some of our partners, NATO partners, as well in Central Asia and Caucasus, Moldova, elsewhere.
So yeah, I mean simply to stop at concern isn't enough. The whole nuclear question Pavel was talking about earlier… I'm not going to say more about this, but look, Soviet Union collapsed and we were fearful of nuclear proliferation
Howard: We spent billions of dollars trying to prevent further proliferation.
Bugajski: Yeah. I mean, Ukraine could say now, which we hadn't given up those nuclear weapons, because we wouldn't have been attacked if it's backfire bombers…
Yeah. I personally don't think that the regime is based on corruption, stolen assets.
Putin worried about his health as others. Is he going to start a nuclear war? They're not nuclear terrorists. They're not going to start a nuclear war with the West in terms of tactical weapons, tactical nuclear weapons.
Trevor: You're saying Putin is still rational.
Bugajski: Yeah, it depends…
Trevor: It's bluff, it's bluff, but he's also rational.
Bugajski: Yeah, I mean, look. He takes things to the brink. He's trying to frighten the West. He knows how to play the West. He's, you know, it's KGB guy. He knows how to manipulate people, get the most out of them, for them, to submit without him having to actually do anything. So you know. Stop the question of chess. It's a question of poker basically.
Howard: Well, that's what Bob Gates said. He said, "Putin plays weaker poker, but he plays it well."
Has anybody got any questions? Yes, go right ahead, please.
Unidentified person #1: [unclear, represents himself]. Yeah, I have a question to Dr. Andrei. So are you… You were a chief economic advisor. So I assume you know Putin very well, and I'm very curious what Putin is really thinking about. So what is his ultimate purpose of invading Ukraine? And what would you recommend Putin do right now, yeah? Give us the next few pieces of good advice.
Illarionov: Withdraw all Russian troops from Ukraine, from Moldova, from Georgia and after that commit suicide.
Unidentified person #1: Okay, I got it. That's on the road.
Howard: Yes, right here. And do we have any questions from the audience?
Unidentified person #2: I was curious about the comments about everything happening in such a compressed fashion after the meeting with Xi. Why do you think he wanted that war brought to a close? Why do you think this whole accelerated schedule was put on the table? If that was the outcome…
Howard: The question is why is it wanting an accelerated schedule?
Unidentified person #2: China…
Illarionov: The question was why chairman Xi wanted.
Howard: Yes, why does Xi want him to accelerate?
Unidentified person #2: And then if I may have followed this whole question about nuclear weapons. I'm just curious what's your assessment. Is it a five percent probability, is it just an impossibility that Putin will not use a nuclear, a number of tactical nuclear weapons as an escalator?
Howard: So the second question is what is the end game on the use of nuclear weapons?
Unidentified person #2: A probability. Is it 0%, 5%, 20%? What?
Illarionov: Okay. First of all, concerning the approach from the chairman Xi I don't know what was the reason behind, but it was a very clear and very very persistent because, first of all, we extract these understanding from his body language, from the press releases, from the comments. On that and a week later, even 10 days later it has been confirmed by official press releases from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China. So that is why it looks like we were right by assessing what he told Putin but we understand that Xi probably recommended or suggested or some kind of invited, couldn't be closer, as fast as possible. Putin got from this recommendation that he needs to do it, but he needs to finish it with a victory for himself. So that's why he need to secure all these territorial acquisitions that he was able to get within these seven plus months of this war. And that is why he is trying to raise the stakes to guarantee. That is my understanding.
If that line of logic is correct or if it will be correct after some time, I will see that, it means that all these talks about mobilization, it's just bluff. It means that all these people mobilized would not be used. They mobilize just to produce… The more people around the world are talking about mobilization, the more they are talking about those people fleeing Russia, all these stories, that's good because Putin by doing this produces an impression. He's trying to scare everybody within the country, outside of the country. Okay, he's such a dangerous person. He can mobilize. That is why…
For example, leaks. Officially Shoigu says 300,000. Immediately they produce a so-called "leak" that in essense they are trying to mobilize 1,000,000 people. Who can produce this leak? Kremlin. Only the Kremlin. So that is why it was on purpose that they're going to produce scare.
He said about these nuclear weapons, as hinted at. And after that started all this discussion about nuclear, and Putin is just enjoying it by seeing this discussion about nuclear everywhere, maybe not us because he did not have much time to watch our session. But essentially he is very much…
And actually just look at the timing when he made this statement. He actually, originally, planned to do it on September 20th and after that he moved to September 21st. Remember that was a lot of the question why. That's very simple. On September 21st all world dignitaries were gathering in New York, and President Biden was making his speech. So that is why he prepared exactly that everybody in New York would discuss the nuclear threat from Putin. That is a purpose. This is a psychological warfare that Glenn was talking about. This is a bluff, the highest possible bluff. So that is why, once again, we don't know if let's say tomorrow, the day after tomorrow it happens to be, it will appear that he is much more serious than we… We can try to decide for him today. That would be a different story.
But so far I don't see any serious preparation for full-scale war because as Glenn has mentioned again not enough polygons. That's true. It's not enough good weapon, which is true. There are some better, there are some outdated weapons, but not enough good weapons.
For example, economic mobilization. It did not start. There is no economic… There is no mobilization of the Russian economy. The number of military expenditures is unbelievably low: 3.6% of GDP. For the war waged against the country 3.6 percent of GDP is a joke.
So there are many, and that actually… They did not close the border for those people fleeing mobilization. If you are serious about mobilization…
Howard: …close the border.
Illarionov: The first thing that you close the border, you would not allow to cross it.
So we can continue with many, many other observations, with signs that suggest that it looks like he's not too serious about that.
So that is what your question is about nuclear. We don't know because he was not once able to surprise people. So that is why we cannot say that it's a zero probability. We cannot say so.
But I like the answer of General Zaluzhnyi, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian forces who has written in his article that was published several weeks ago. He said, "Regardless of Putin's decision whether he will use nuclear weapons or not, we are ready to fight. It does not bother us. It might bother somebody else who would like to. But regardless whether he will use tactical or strategic or whatever, we will be fighting no matter what."
So that is why I think it's an absolutely right approach. It's, I would say, Churchill's approach from 1940, from the darkest hour. Regardless of what they're going to use and how they're going to use it, we will be fighting. We will fight on beaches. We will fight everywhere, but we will never surrender. That's the main message. and I think it's absolutely correct.
Howard: Yes, there is an online question. "Could the speakers explore how Xi's, China's large influence on Putin? Is it exclusively economic or are there other contributing factors? My name is Paige and I'm currently a university student at the University of Toronto."
Why does Putin have the… or why does Xi have this kind of outsized influence on Putin?
Baev: I am not sure it's an outsize influence.
Howard: Well that's my term, not hers.
Baev: Yes, I understand. There is influence, definitely, and there is no friendship. I am confident in that. But China is still a big Russian neighbor, an economic giant compared to Russia, the only strategic partner for Russia which makes sense.
For what little I know from the inside, when Putin visited China in February for the Olympic Games he didn't explicitly say that he's going to attack. That tells you the limit of that kind of confidence between the two leaders
But in certain situations, when Russia is becoming much more dependent on China than it used to be, Xi Jinping's words carried a lot of weight. And I think one particular word which is probably given is about nuclear weapons. And I think this word is "don't even think about."
Howard: You think Xi mentioned that.
Baev: Yes.
Illarionov: I can only say that if somebody has an influence on Putin, it is Chairman Xi, nobody else. And the reason for that… Putin was developing for the last two decades the special relations with Chinese leadership, regardless who is personally occupying the position of the Chairman, in order to create, develop, strengthen the two-party alliance, Russia-China alliance with a very clear anti-Western direction. And it's clear that Mr Putin overplayed his intentions. So he was much more interested in such a strategic alliance, as he likes to say, and put in all these statements [about] strategic alignment between Russia and China, and the Chinese side is much more distant from such understanding.
And once again, the last meeting between Xi and Putin in Samarkand clearly showed that Xi does not want to be in a strategic partnership with Putin as Putin wants. And Putin sees China as the critical alliance in his so-called Western March, march against the west. And that is why he's providing whatever major diplomatic, psychological support for assumed Xi's march on Taiwan, and he, some kind of, hopes that it will be reciprocal. So if I would help you in your attack on Taiwan, please help me in my attack on Ukraine and on the West. But it's very clear that Xi does not want such reciprocality.
Howard: Okay. Well, thank you. If there's no more questions?
Bugajski: I have one question for Andrei. Make it quick what's the defeat for Putin. You were talking about Melitopol, Mariupol. If they fell to Ukraine, Ukrainian forces, what would it lead do?
Illarionov: I would say… I would reformulate your question. I would say, "what is a victory for Ukraine?" First of all…
Bugajski: Well, to drive all Russian forces out of Ukraine.
Illarionov: First of all…
Howard: Out of Ukraine, going back…
Illarionov: No. 1 is the occupation of all occupied territories including Donbas, Crimea and Sevastopol. It's a no. 1. There is no debate about the line of February 23rd or 24th. It's just kind of a deviation from the point. Second, to secure that in any receivable future Russia under Putin or under anyone after Putin would not attack Ukraine again. So these are the two most important conditions for the victory of Ukraine. All others, just any kind of intermediate settlements would give appetite to Putin or you know somebody else just to repeat new attacks on Ukraine. So it is not sustainable.
So that is why those who are interested in creating stable peace in this part of the world should look for, first of all, deoccupation and, second, creation of whatever arrangement, security arrangements which Russia with Ukraine, with other countries that would guarantee that Russia under any leadership would not repeat.
Bugajski: Will not have the capability to do it again.
You know capability is a result of some particular process: economic process, technological process.
Well, what is important is the kind of mentality that the Russian leadership would refuse to have in the mentality, to attack aggressively any neighbor along the border just would be good. Ukraine will be first, but it will be the same as any other neighbor as well Georgia or Moldova or Belarus or Baltic countries or Kazakhstan. It just doesn't matter.
Howard: So you're talking about if like in post-WW1 demilitarization of the Rhineland that type of…
Illarionov: I would say… We can consult with Mr Putin. Mr Putin is the best consultant to us in that matter. What he was talking to us last autumn, in this winter. He was talking abou what is his nightmare scenario. Nightmare scenario is ballistic missiles, American ballistic missiles on Ukrainian territory.
Baev: Not necessarily ballistic.
Illarionov: No, he was talking about this kind of thing.
Baev: He didn't know they were ballistic.
Illarionov: Okay. Mr Biden was talking that he has no intention to put the ballistic missiles on Ukrainian territory. So it looks like if just follow this line if it's a nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles will be deployed on the Ukrainian territory, Mr Putin would restore his sleep
Howard: What?
Illarionov: Sleeping, the ability to sleep calmly, so just it not bother him much. So that is, what it would probably be, it's one of the elements that would stop his aggressive thinking because what is important in this world, especially with the nuclear power, is the risk of response, of retaliation. Not any some kind of security guarantee that could be produced on paper by Mr Rasmussen or by anybody else. No. The only directly understanding of retaliation. Retaliation that could be absolutely impossible for…
Howard: Like mutually assured destruction…
Illarionov: Some sort, something like that. Yeah, you get my point.
Howard: I mean I've actually heard that term from the Ukrainians. I mean, about development, about developing their own nuclear capabilities…
Illarionov: Once again, it's technical details whether it's nuclear or ballistic missile or something else. It's a technical detail. What is important is just to have a guaranteed retaliation. That is intolerable from the Kremlin's point of view. That's a guarantee for peace. That was a guarantee for peace for 40 years of course. We are okay and it kept peace between two nuclear superpowers quite well. So it looks like that principle can be used in this particular relationship.
Bugajski: Okay, but it didn't keep peace between nuclear and non-nuclear…
Illarionov: And that's a different story. Okay. But if… Okay. That's why we need to think how to help Ukraine to solve this problem.
Howard: Okay. Well, on that note it's 5:10. We appreciate everybody for watching and your patience with Jamestown. And this new facility we're using and helping make a very lively and very interesting fascinating discussion will be posted online. You'll be able to watch it on YouTube. We all took a lot of notes. Andrei, Pavel and Janusz, thank you for speaking today, and I look forward to seeing you again virtually and in person. Thank you.
Illarionov: Thank you.
